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A REPORT OF US PHYSICIANS’ BELIEFS ABOUT PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED 
SUICIDE AND A BIOETHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRACTICE. 
Peter T. Hetzler III, James Nie, Amanda Zhou, and Lydia S. Dugdale. Department of 
Internal Medicine, Yale University, School of Medicine, New Haven, CT.  
 
The goals of this work were two fold. The first was to assess the beliefs of US 
physicians about the national legalization of physician-assisted suicide (PAS). The 
second was to determine the moral permissibility of PAS through a bioethical analysis. 
For the former, we sent a survey to 1000 randomly chosen physicians from around the 
US. For the last, we analyzed the permissibility of PAS by examining four common 
bioethical considerations—role morality, the “slippery slope”, doing vs. allowing, and 
intending vs. foreseeing.  
Our survey indicates that 60% of physicians thought PAS should be legal, and of 
that 60%, 13% answered “yes” when asked if they would perform the practice if it were 
legal. Next, 49% of physicians agreed that most patients who seek PAS do so because of 
pain, and 58% agreed that the current safeguards in place for PAS, in general, are 
adequate to protect patients. With respect to specific safeguards, 60 % disagreed with the 
statement that physicians who are not psychiatrists are adequately trained to screen for 
depression in patients seeking PAS, and 60% disagreed with the idea that physicians can 
predict with certainty whether a patient seeking PAS has 6 months or less to live. Finally, 
about one-third (30%) of physicians thought that the legalization of PAS would lead to 
the legalization of euthanasia, and 46% agreed that insurance companies would 
	
preferentially cover PAS over possible life-saving treatments if PAS was legalized 
nationally. Finally, by examining the bioethical arguments mentioned with respect to 
PAS, we determined that the practice is not morally permissible 
Our survey results suggest several important conclusions about physicians’ beliefs 
of PAS.  The first is that there is a discrepancy between belief and practice of PAS. 
Second, physicians are generally misinformed as to why patients seek PAS, and they are 
uncertain about the adequacy of safeguards. Third, physicians are still wary of the 
slippery slope with respect to PAS legalization nationwide. Furthermore, through our 
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Physician-assisted suicide (PAS), also known as physician aid-in-dying (AID), is 
one of the most contentious ethical issues facing medicine today. American Medical 
Association (AMA) states that, “Physician-assisted suicide occurs when a physician 
facilitates a patient’s death by providing the necessary means and/or information to 
enable the patient to perform the life-ending act.”(1) This practice was first legalized by 
Oregon through the Death with Dignity Act in 1997.(2) Since then, six other jurisdictions 
have legalized the practice, and Montana has decriminalized it(3). As a comparison, 
internationally, physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia are legal in Canada, 
Netherlands, Belgium, Colombia, and Luxemburg.(4) A recent Gallup poll indicates that 
67% of the American public support legalization of PAS.(5) Support for the practice 
among physicians has also risen from 46 % in 2010 and 54 % in 2014 to 57 % in 2016.(6)  
Physician-assisted suicide is defined as a physician prescribing a lethal dose of 
drugs that patients then administer themselves with the intention of ending their lives. 
This practice is distinct from euthanasia, in which a physician directly administers a drug 
or drugs with the intention of ending the patient’s life. The major distinction between the 
two is who administers the lethal dose of medication. In the former, the patient 
administers it. In the latter, the physician is the agent who administers the lethal dose. 
Although this may seem like a rather small distinction, it makes all the difference. The 
patient is the agent who causes her own death in the first case, while the physician is the 
agent who causes the death of the patient in the latter case.  
In the US, there are certain conditions or safeguards that must be met for a patient 
to successfully obtain a prescription for a lethal dose of barbiturates, which are the drugs 
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of choice for PAS. Although each state has slightly different conditions, they all closely 
follow Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, as it was the first state to legalize assisted 
suicide.  
For brevity and clarity, I will explain Oregon’s program. First, the patient must be 
at least 18 years old, a resident of Oregon, and capable of making medical decisions 
(meaning the patient must be competent). The next condition is that the patient must be 
diagnosed with a terminal illness that will end her life in 6 months or less. Then, a patient 
must make two oral requests to her physician that are separated by at least fifteen days. 
Following this, a patent must provide a written request to her physician that is signed in 
the presence of two witnesses. The original physician and a consulting physician must 
then confirm the prognosis and diagnosis of the patient. At this time, they must also 
assess the patient for competency. If, during this examination, they determine that the 
patient may be depressed or suffering from any mental illness, they must refer the patient 
to a psychiatrist for a formal psychological assessment. Once all of these steps have been 
completed (as necessary), the original physician must inform the patient of alternatives to 
PAS, such as hospice, comfort care, and pain control, and request (but not require) the 
patient to inform next-of-kin about her decision to partake in PAS. The physician may 
then provide the patient a written prescription for a lethal dose of barbiturates that the 
patient may then ingest at whatever time she thinks is appropriate.(7)  
 As this practice increasingly becomes an option for patients and their physicians 
to consider, it is important to understand what the attitudes and perspectives of practicing 
US physicians are concerning PAS and discuss the moral permissibility of the practice. In 
Part I of this thesis I will report the findings of a national study looking at perspectives of 
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US physicians with respect to PAS. In Part II, I will first discuss the moral permissibility 
of PAS by analyzing four bioethical arguments.  
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 A recent review of attitudes and practices of PAS in the US, Canada, and Europe 
concluded that PAS is increasingly becoming legalized, is performed relatively rarely, 
and is primarily utilized by patients with cancer.(8) A national survey study in 2008 
about physicians’ attitudes toward PAS also revealed that highly religious physicians are 
more likely to oppose PAS than those with low religiosity.(9) These data are consistent 
with previous findings of national surveys of physicians and osteopathic physicians that 
found that religion was associated with objections to PAS.(10,11) The 2008 study also 
found that being of Asian ethnicity, of Hindu religious affiliation, and having more 
experience with end-of-life care were also associated with objecting to the practice of 
PAS.(9)  
Although those are the only national survey studies looking at physician attitudes 
toward PAS, there have been several institutional and regional studies examining views 
of physicians, which have shown that physicians’ views toward PAS are affected by 
religion, religiosity, ethnicity, medical specialty, and age. Cohen et al. showed that in 
Washington State in 1994, oncologists and hematologists were least likely to support 
PAS, while psychiatrists were most likely.(12) A 1995 study of Michigan oncologists 
revealed five factors that were important to physicians when considering the approval or 
disapproval of PAS: global attitudes toward PAS (including ideas like “Does a patient 
have a right to end his or her life if he or she has an incurable disease,” and “Oncologists 
should have the right to help a patient commit suicide by medical means”), attitudes 
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toward the acceptability of withholding/withdrawing life-sustaining therapies, 
philosophical prohibitions toward PAS, concerns of legal consequences of PAS, and 
beliefs that PAS could be avoided with better end-of-life care.(13) A study of Oregon 
emergency medicine physicians in 1996 showed that support of legalization of PAS was 
not influenced by gender, age, or practice location. It did show, however, those without 
religious affiliations were more likely to support PAS legalization, and Catholic 
respondents were least likely to support it.(14) 
A survey of Connecticut physicians in 2000 showed that views on PAS were 
strongly associated with religious affiliation, religiosity, ethnicity, and medical 
specialty.(15) A survey given to Tennessee physicians in 2003 found that factors that 
influenced beliefs about PAS were ethics, religion, and the role of the physician to relieve 
pain and suffering.(16) Connecticut internists’ attitudes toward PAS in 2004 were 
significantly influenced by frequency of attendance of religious services and experience 
providing primary care to terminally ill patients.(17) Another study in Connecticut in 
2004 showed that medical house officers from three different internal medicine residency 
programs were possibly influenced by religious commitments and pressures of training 
when thinking about the acceptability of performing PAS.(18) 
Most recently, a study at a large academic institution found that 63% percent of 
physicians thought PAS should be legal, but only 22% of that percentage would be 
willing to participate in the practice.(19) This trend was also observed in Tennessee 
physicians in 2003—of the physicians who supported PAS, only 25% indicated that they 
would perform it.(16) This is an important finding that requires further study to be 
understood more thoroughly. If the practice of PAS is to be continually expanded to more 
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states without understanding why physicians are generally supportive of PAS but 
opposed to actually preforming it, it could lead to numerous problems including feelings 
of dissatisfaction with or mistrust of the profession of medicine by both physicians and 
patients, poor outcomes surrounding PAS, and a lack of appropriate and effective end-of-
life care. 
 Thus, the aims of this study were threefold. The first was to investigate whether 
the discrepancy between attitudes about legalization versus willingness to practice PAS 
holds true nationally. Our hypothesis is that it does. Next, we assessed why this 
discrepancy between belief and willingness to practice exists. Finally, we aimed to update 
and expand the understanding of physicians’ attitudes toward PAS since the last national 
study was in 2008. We have included questions regarding the beliefs of physicians on 
possible economic and social ramifications of PAS legalization and the efficacy of 
safeguards in place, which to our knowledge have not been previously studied by a 











We used an amended version of methods previously described to design our 
survey.(20) First, we tested eleven questions (see appendix 1) about PAS on fifteen Yale-
New Haven Hospital physicians. Each physician received a US$10 gift card for 
	 	 	7
participating. This first testing step helped us choose appropriate wording and content of 
questions. Using this data, we then developed our first 37-question survey. To eliminate 
as much bias as possible, we attempted to ask an equal number of positively and 
negatively worded questions regarding PAS. This survey was then administered to ten 
Yale-New Haven physicians (different from the previous 15) in person. The physicians 
were asked to take the survey and provide feedback in real-time about the relevance, 
wording, clarity, and effectiveness of each question. Each physician received a US$20 
dollar gift card for participation. Following the feedback given to us during the pretest, 
we designed our final survey. As a final check for survey validity, we sent the finalized 
survey to three individuals with experience in survey design before administering it.      
Survey Content 
 
The final survey can be found in the appendix (appendix 2). We first defined the 
terms “physician-assisted suicide (PAS),” “physician aid-in-dying (AID),” and euthanasia 
in a preamble to eliminate possible confusion in terminology. The survey contained six 
sections. The first was “Legality of PAS/AID” and included the questions “Should 
PAS/AID be legal in your state?” and “Should PAS/AID be decriminalized in your 
state?” which could be answered yes or no. The third question asked, “If legal or 
decriminalized, would you participate in PAS/AID?” which could be answered with yes, 
possibly, unlikely, or never.   
The second section was “Current Practices of PAS/AID”, which asked participants to 
what extent they agreed on a five point Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, neutral, 
disagree, strongly disagree) with statements about reasons for patients seeking PAS/AID 
and safety and efficacy of current safeguards in states where the practice is legal. This 
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section of the survey was designed to assess the knowledge and beliefs of physicians 
about current practices of PAS/AID. The statements were the following: 
 
• Most patients who seek PAS/AID do so because of physical pain.  
• Current PAS/AID laws provide safeguards (patient must be competent, ≥ 18 yo, 
prognosis ≤ 6 mo, capable of self-administration of medication, request observed 
by 2 witnesses). 
o These safeguards are adequate to protect patients seeking PAS/AID. 
• Current PAS/AID laws require physicians who suspect depression or other mental 
illness in a patient seeking PAS/AID to consult a psychiatrist. 
o Physicians who are not psychiatrists are sufficiently trained to screen for 
depression in patients who are seeking PAS/AID. 
• Most physicians can predict with certainty whether a patient seeking PAS/AID 
has 6 months or less to live. 
 
Section three, entitled “Implications of PAS/AID”, included statements concerning 
the social, professional, and economic implications of the national legalization of 
PAS/AID. Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with the 
statements on the same Likert scale. This section was designed to ask physicians 
questions that they might not normally think about when considering the legalization of 
PAS. The statements were the following: 
• PAS/AID would improve the clinical care of patients at the end-of-life. 
• Patients would view the medical profession more negatively. 
• Patients would trust their physicians more. 
• Racial and ethnic minorities would feel pressure to end their lives. 
• Patients with lower socioeconomic status would feel pressure to end their lives. 
• Patients with mental or physical disabilities would feel pressure to end their lives. 
• PAS/AID would save money for the health care system. 
• Health insurance companies would cover PAS/AID over more expensive, 
possibly life-saving treatments, like chemotherapy. 
• PAS/AID would lead to an increased number of medical malpractice suits. 
• PAS/AID would lead to an increase in suicides in the community. 
• PAS/AID would lead to the legalization of euthanasia. 
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The next section, “Other Considerations Regarding PAS/AID,” included ethical and 
moral statements about PAS/AID that could be answered using the same Likert scale. 
The statements were the following: 
• Sometimes providing PAS/AID is necessary in order to relieve suffering. 
• Sometimes providing PAS/AID is necessary in order to respect patient 
autonomy. 
• There are important ethical distinctions between PAS/AID and withdrawing life-
support. 
• PAS/AID would be unnecessary if all patients had access to excellent palliative 
care. 
• The medical profession should endorse PAS/AID as a morally valid medical 
option. 
• Physicians who participate in PAS/AID thereby abandon their patients. 
• A patient’s request for PAS/AID should override the physician’s moral 
objections to performing it. 
 
The fifth section, “Physician Perspectives on Death,” contained statements about 
physicians’ own mortality that could be answered using the same Likert scale. The 
statements were the following: 
• I am comfortable talking with patients about death 
• My ability to think about my own mortality is relevant to providing good care for 
patients at the end of life. 
• Medical professionals should never intentionally hasten a patient’s death at the 
end of life. 
 
This section also contained a question asking “ How often are you faced with end-of-life 
issues in your daily practice?” that could be answered by selecting one of the following 
choices: several times a week, every week, nearly every week, two to three times a 
month, about once a month, several times a year, about once or twice a year, less than 
once a year, or never. A final question asking, “If you think PAS/AID should be legal or 
decriminalized but would be unwilling or unlikely to perform it yourself, please explain 
why,” was included in the section and could be answered in a free response manner.  
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The final section included demographic questions including age, preferred gender 
identity (answered as free response), ethnicity, race, Veterans Affairs association, 
percentage of practice involving patients who are underinsured or on Medicaid, and 
medical specialty.  
Survey Administration 
 
We followed validated administration methods already described in the 
literature.(9,21,22) We chose a random sample of 1000 practicing physicians (age 25-79) 
from the American Medical Association Physician Masterfile, a database intended to 
include all physicians in the United States. Five-hundred physicians were chosen at 
random from all specialties, excluding pathology and radiology, and 500 were chosen 
from specialties more likely to involve end-of-life care (geriatrics, pediatric critical care, 
pulmonary and critical care, oncology, physical medicine and rehabilitation, and hospice 
and palliative medicine). We used the services of the Yale Printing and Publishing for all 
mailings. Each physician was assigned a number (1-1000), which was included on each 
survey to maintain confidentiality while recording responses. In order to bolster response 
rate, we mailed the questionnaire out three times (February 2018, April 2018, June 2018). 
The final mailing included a note and a US$2 incentive to help bolster response rate.  
Data Analysis 
 
Data from hard copy surveys were input into excel files by two different 
researchers to reduce input error. Answers using the Likert Scale were condensed into 
“agree” (agree, strongly agree), “neural”, and “disagree” (disagree, strongly disagree). 
Answers to how often physicians provided end-of-life care were condensed into “often” 
(several times a week, every week, nearly every week), “sometimes” (two to three times 
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a month, about once a month, several times a year), and “rarely” (about once or twice a 
year, less than once a year, never). Age categories ((25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-75, 
75+) were condensed into ≤54 and ≥55 years. Categories for percentages of patients who 
were underinsured or on Medicaid (0-14, 15-29, 30-44, 45-59, 60-74, 75-89, 90-100) 
were condensed into <30, 30-74, ≥75%. Regions where physicians practice were 
determined by the following: Northeast (ME, MA, RI, CT, NH, VT, NY, PA, NJ, DE, 
MD), Southeast (WV, VA, KY, TN, NC, SC, GA, AL, MS, AR, LA, FL), Midwest (OH, 
IN, MI, IL, MO, WI, MN, IA, KS, NE, SD, ND), Southwest (TX, OK, NM, AZ), and 
West (CO, WY, MT, ID, WA, OR, UT, NV, CA, AK, HI). All numerical data are 
reported as percentages. Answers to the free response questions were coded to identify 
common themes. In an attempt to account for our sampling method and make our results 
more generalizable to the general population of US physicians, case weights were 
assigned to percentages.(23) The case weights were determined by comparing the ratio of 
specialties in our sample to that of the entire population of US physicians. Italicized 
percentages reported in the “Results” and “Discussion” sections indicate that they are 
case weighted.  




Survey Response Rate 
 
Of the 1000 physicians who were mailed the survey, 61 came back as 
undeliverable by the postal service. Those individuals were considered ineligible. At the 
closure of data collection, we used a method described by Curlin et al. to determine the 
approximate number of ineligible non-respondents.(21) Thirty respondents and 30 non-
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respondents were chosen in alphabetical order. The phone numbers for each were found 
via a yellow pages Internet search. They were called and asked if they had received the 
survey. Those who could be reached and did receive the survey were considered eligible. 
Those who could not be reached or did not receive the survey were deemed ineligible. A 
calculation was then used to determine approximately how many of the non-respondents 
were ineligible. We were able to locate 29 out of the 30 (0.97) responders and 26 out of 
the 30 (0.87) non-responders. We then estimated that 90% (1-[0.97-0.87]) of those who 
did not respond (751) were eligible. Our estimated response rate of eligible physicians is 
therefore 22% (188/[188 + 0.90*751]).  
Demographics 
 
Demographic information of the respondents is listed in Table 1. Eighty-three 
(44%) were 54-years-old or under, and 91 (48%) were 55-years-old or older. Sixty (32%) 
identified themselves as female, 99 (53%) as male, and 29 (15%) did not wish to specify. 
With respect to ethnicity, 7 (4%) were Hispanic or Latino, and 164 (87%) were not. With 
respect to race, 1 (1%) was Asian, 8 (4%) were East Asian/Pacific Islander, 6 (3%) were 
South Asian, 2 (1%) were Other Asian, 8 (4%) were Black/African American, 1 (1%) 
was American Indian/Alaskan Native, 133 (70%) were White/Caucasian, 7 (4%) were 
other, and 6 (3%) did not wish to specify. With respect to specialty, 28 (15%) were 
Internal Medicine, 30 (16%) were Family Medicine/Practice, 24 (13%) were Surgery, 12 
(6%) were Psychiatry, 11 (6%) were Obstetrics/Gynecology, 3 (2%) were Neurology, 20 
(11%) were Emergency Medicine, 8 (4%) were Anesthesia, 30 (16%) were Pediatrics, 
and 8 (4) were other. Three (2%) practiced at a Veteran Affairs facility, and 171 (91%) 
did not. With respect to the percentage of patients in physicians’ practices that were on 
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Medicaid or underinsured, 92 (49%) had less than 30%, 62 (33%) had 30 to 74%, and 13 
(7%) had greater than or equal to 75%. Forty (22%) practiced in the Northeast, 52 (28%) 
in the Southeast, 46 (24%) in the Midwest, 15 (8%) in the Southwest, and 34 (18%) in the 
West. With respect to how often physicians provided end-of-life care in their practices,  





Table 1. Characteristics of the 188 physicians who responded to the survey.  
Age n (%)A 
   ≤54 83 (44) 
   ≥55 91 (48) 
Gender Identity  
   Female 60 (32) 
   Male 99 (53) 
   Do not wish to specify 29 (15) 
Hispanic or Latino  
   Yes 7 (4) 
   No 164 (87) 
Race  
   Asian 1 (1) 
   East Asian/Pacific Islander 8 (4) 
   South Asian 6 (3) 
   Other Asian 2 (1) 
   Black/African American 8 (4) 
   American Indian/Alaskan Native 1 (1) 
   White/Caucasian 133 (70) 
   Other 7 (4) 
   Do not wish to specify 6 (3) 
Specialty  
   Internal Medicine 28 (15) 
   Family Medicine/Practice 30 (16) 
   Surgery 24 (13) 
   Psychiatry 12 (6) 
   Obstetrics/Gynecology 11 (6) 
   Neurology 3 (2) 
   Emergency Medicine 20 (11) 
   Anesthesia 
   Pediatrics 
8 (4) 
30 (16) 
   Other 8 (4) 
Practice at Veteran Affairs facility  
   Yes 3 (2) 
   No 171 (91) 
Percentage of patients in practice that are on Medicaid or underinsured  
   < 30  92 (49) 
   30-74 62 (33) 
   ≥75 13 (7) 
Region of practice  
   Northeast  40 (21) 
   Southeast  52 (28) 
   Midwest 46 (24) 
   Southwest 15 (8) 
   West 34 (18) 
How often physicians provide end-of-life careB  
   Often 33 (18) 
   Sometimes 78 (41) 
   Rarely 73 (39) 
APercentages do not add up to 100 due to incomplete survey data.  
BData condensed from 9 to 3 categories.  
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Legality of PAS 
 
Table 2 shows the number of physicians who thought PAS should be legalized or 
decriminalized. One-hundred and seven (57, 60%) physicians thought PAS should be 
legal [78 (41, 38 %) illegal], and 125 (66, 69%) thought it should be decriminalized [60 
(32, 30%) not decriminalized] in their respective states (Table 2).  
Table 2. The number of physicians who thought PAS should be legalized or 
decriminalized. “PAS” is an abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide. Italicized percentages 
are case weighted. 















APercentages do not add up to 100 due to incomplete survey data.  
 
Table 3 shows the number of respondents who answered “yes”, “possibly”, 
“unlikely”, or “never” when asked if they would perform PAS is it were legal in their 
state. Fifteen (8, 9%) indicated “yes”, 42 (22, 25%) replied “possibly”, 62 (33, 32%) were 
“unlikely” to, and 67 (36, 33%) would “never” (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. The number of physicians who answered “yes”, “possibly”, “unlikely”, or 
“never” when asked if they would perform PAS if it were legal in their state. “PAS” is an 
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Current Practices of PAS  
 
 Table 4 shows the number of participants who agreed, disagreed, or were neutral 
when asked questions about the current practices of PAS in states where it is legal. When 
asked, “Most patients who seek PAS/AID do so because of physical pain,” 81 (43, 49%) 
physicians agreed, 40 (21, 24%) disagreed, and 63 (34, 26%) were neutral (Table 4). 
When asked, “Current PAS/AID laws provide adequate safeguards, ” 99 (53, 58%) 
agreed, 54 (29, 29%) disagreed, and 30 (16, 13%) were neutral (Table 4).  When asked, 
“Physicians who are not psychiatrists are sufficiently trained to screen for depression in 
patients who are seeking PAS/AID,” 40 (21, 23%) agreed, 104 (55, 60%) disagreed, and 
39 (21, 16%) were neutral (Table 4). When asked, “Most physicians can predict with 
certainty whether a patient seeking PAS/AID has 6 months or less to live,” 31 (16, 18%) 
agreed, 114 (61, 60%) disagreed, and 38 (20, 22%) were neutral (Table 4).  
Table 4. Physicians’ responses to questions about the current practices of PAS in states 
where it is legal. “PAS” is an abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide. “AID” is an 
abbreviation for aid-in-dying. Italicized percentages are case weighted.  
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Implications of PAS Legalization 
 
 Table 5 shows the number of participants who agreed, disagreed, or were neutral 
when asked questions about several professional, social, economic, and legal 
considerations if PAS were to become legalized nationally. When asked, “PAS/AID 
would improve the clinical care of patients at the end-of-life,” 96 (51, 52%) agreed, 60 
(32, 33%) disagreed, and 27 (14, 14%) were neutral (Table 5). When asked, “Patients 
would view the medical profession more negatively, ” 46 (24, 26%) agreed, 82 (43, 43%) 
disagreed, and 55 (29, 32%) were neutral (Table 5). When asked, “Patients would trust 
their physicians more, ” 43 (23, 24%) agreed, 64 (34, 35%) disagreed, and 75 (40, 40%) 
were neutral (Table 5).  
When asked, “Racial and ethnic minorities would feel pressure to end their lives,” 
20 (11, 9%) physicians agreed, 121 (64, 69%) disagreed, and 43 (23, 23%) were neutral 
(Table 5). When asked, “Patients with lower socioeconomic status would feel pressure to 
end their lives, ” 32 (17, 15%) physicians agreed, 106 (56, 58%) disagreed, and 46 (24, 
25%) were neutral (Table 5). When asked, “Patients with mental or physical disabilities 
would feel pressure to end their lives,” 50 (27, 24%) physicians agreed, 89 (47, 49%) 
disagreed, and 45 (24, 26%) were neutral (Table 5).  
 When asked, “PAS/AID would save money for the health care system,” 107 (57, 
62%) physicians agreed, 29 (15, 18%) disagreed, and 48 (26, 19%) were neutral (Table 
5).  When asked, “Health insurance companies would cover PAS/AID over more 
expensive, possibly life-saving treatments, like chemotherapy,” 93 (49, 46%) physicians 
agreed, 35 (19, 20%) disagreed, and 55 (29, 34%) were neutral (Table 5).  
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When asked, “PAS/AID would lead to an increased number of medical 
malpractice suits,” 55 (29, 28%) agreed, 72 (38, 43%) disagreed, and 56 (30, 28%) were 
neutral (Table 5). When asked, “PAS/AID would lead to an increase in suicides in the 
community,” 68 (36, 32%) agreed, 87 (46, 51%) disagreed, 28 (15, 17%) were neutral 
(Table 5). When asked, “PAS/AID would lead to the legalization of euthanasia,” 61 (32, 




Table 5. Physicians’ responses to professional, social, economic, and legal considerations of the 
national legalization of PAS. “PAS” is an abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide. “AID” is an 
abbreviation for aid-in-dying. Italicized percentages are case weighted.  
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APercentages do not add up to 100 due to incomplete survey data.  
 
Other Considerations Regarding PAS 
 
Table 6 shows the number of participants who agreed, disagreed, and were neutral 
when asked questions about ethical considerations regarding the national legalization of 
PAS. When asked “Sometimes providing PAS/AID is necessary in order to relieve 
suffering,” 120 (64, 65%) agreed, 49 (26, 28%) disagreed, and 16 (8, 6%) were neutral 
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(Table 6). When asked, “Sometimes providing PAS/AID is necessary in order to respect 
patient autonomy,” 107 (57, 58%) agreed, 50 (27, 29%) disagreed, and 28 (15, 12%) 
were neutral (Table 6).  
When asked, “There are important ethical distinctions between PAS/AID and 
withdrawing life-support,” 146 (78, 78%) agreed, 22 (12, 11%) disagreed, and 15 (8, 
10%) were neutral (Table 6). When asked, “PAS/AID would be unnecessary if all 
patients had access to excellent palliative care,” 64 (34, 38%) agreed, 80 (43, 45%) 
disagreed, and 38 (20, 18%) were neutral (Table 6). 
 When asked, “The medical profession should endorse PAS/AID as a morally 
valid medical option,” 89 (47, 49%) physicians agreed, 66 (35, 32%) disagreed, and 29 
(15, 17%) were neutral (Table 6). When asked, “Physicians who participate in PAS/AID 
thereby abandon their patients,” 16 (9, 13%) agreed, 144 (77, 76%) disagreed, and 23 
(12, 10%) were neutral (Table 6). When asked, “A patient’s request for PAS/AID should 
override the physician’s moral objections to performing it,” 37 (20, 20%) agreed, 123 




















Table 6. Physicians’ responses to ethical considerations of the national legalization of PAS. 
“PAS” is an abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide. “AID” is an abbreviation for aid-in-dying. 
Italicized percentages are case weighted.  
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APercentages do not add up to 100 due to incomplete survey data.    
 
Physician Perspectives on Death 
 
Table 7 shows the number of participants who agreed, disagreed, and were neutral 
when asked questions concerning their personal beliefs about death and its relevance to 
the practice of medicine. When asked, “I am comfortable talking with patients about 
death,” 156 (83, 83%) agreed, 13 (7, 6%) disagreed, and 16 (9, 10%) were neutral (Table 
7). When asked, “My ability to think about my own mortality is relevant to providing 
good care for patients at the end of life,” 155 (82, 81%) agreed, 12 (6, 11%) disagreed, 
and 18 (10, 8%) were neutral (Table 7). When asked, “Medical professionals should 
never intentionally hasten a patient’s death at the end of life,” 74 (39, 43%) physicians 
agreed, 80 (43, 41 %) disagreed, and 30 (16, 15 %) were neutral (Table 7).   
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Table 7. Physicians’ responses to questions concerning their personal beleifs about death and 
its relevance to the practice of medicine. Italicized percentages are case weighted.  
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Table 8 shows the crosstabulation of those who thought PAS should be legal or 
decriminalized and how likely they would perform PAS if it were legal or decriminalized 
in their state. Of those who thought PAS should be legal, 16 (15%) would, 40 (37%) 
“possibly” would, 38 (36%) were “unlikely” to, and 13 (12%) would “never” perform it 
(Table 8). Of those who thought PAS should be decriminalized, 16 (13%) would, 40 
(32%) “possibly” would, 47 (37%) were “unlikely” to, and 23 (18%) would “never” 
perform it (Table 8). 
Table 8. The self-reported likelihood of physicians who thought PAS should be legal or 
decriminalized performing PAS. “PAS” is an abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide. 
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 Table 9 shows the crosstabulation of those who thought PAS should be legal and 
their responses to two questions concerning the ethics of PAS. Of those who thought PAS 
should be legal, 84 (81%) agreed, 4 (4%) disagreed, and 16 (15%) were unsure when 
asked, “The medical profession should endorse PAS/AID as a morally valid medical 
option” (Table 9). Of those who thought PAS should be legal, 28 (27%) agreed, 66 (63%) 
disagreed, and 11 (10%) were unsure when asked, “Medical professionals should never 
intentionally hasten a patient’s death at the end of life” (Table 9).  
Table 9. Physicians’, who thought PAS should be legal, responses to two ethical questions 
regarding national PAS legalization. “PAS” is an abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide. 
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Beliefs and Practices of PAS 
 
Table 10 shows the free responses answers of physicians who were asked to 
explain why they thought PAS should be legal or decriminalized but would be unwilling 
or unlikely to perform the practice. The single most common reason given was lack of 
training/expertise (47%) (Table 10). Other, less common themes were religious/spiritual 
teachings (11%), should be an option for patients (8%), legal implications/hurdles (7%), 
ethical/moral opposition to the practice of PAS (5%), PAS is rarely ever truly indicated 
(5%), and could not personally perform PAS due to its inherent severity (4%) (Table 10). 
Themes endorsed by only one respondent were the following: inadequate safeguards in 
place, “great subtleties and greater responsibility involved in performing PAS/AID, “[I] 
would favor smaller # physicians involved to ensure expertise in assessing 
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appropriateness of PAS rather than general medical practitioners uniformly authorized to 
do so,” and “I am afraid patient may have a scary face when dying” (Table 10).  
Table 10. Free responses answers of physicians who were asked to explain why they thought 
PAS should be legal or decriminalized but would be unwilling or unlikely to perform the 
practice. “PAS” is an abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide. “AID” is an abbreviation for 
aid-in-dying.   
 % 
Lack of training/expertise  47 
Spiritual/religious teachings 11 
Should be option for patients 8 
Legal implications/hurdles 7 
Ethical/moral opposition to the practice of PAS 5 
PAS is rarely every truly indicated 5 
Could not personally perform PAS due to its inherent severity 4 
Inadequate safeguards A 1 
“Great subtleties and greater responsibility involved in performing PAS/AID” A 1 
“I am afraid patient may have scary face when dying” A 1 
“[I] would favor small [number of] physicians involved to endure expertise in 
assessing appropriateness of PAS rather than general medical practitioners 










Legality, Beliefs, and Practices of PAS 
 
This study shows that 60% of US physicians believe that PAS should be 
legalized, which is consistent with previous Gallup poll results (57%) (Table 2).(6) We 
also found that 69% of US physicians think the practice should be decriminalized, which 
is a new finding (Table 2). With legalization, there would not be any penalties attributed 
to the act of PAS. While, decriminalization of PAS would mean that there would no 
longer be any criminal penalties of performing the act. Additionally, only 9% of 
respondents indicated that they would unequivocally perform PAS if it were legal (Table 
3). Of those who thought PAS should be legalized or decriminalized, only 15 and 13% 
indicated that they would unequivocally be willing to perform the practice if it were legal 
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or decriminalized, respectively, (Table 8).  Furthermore, of those who thought PAS 
should be legalized or decriminalized, 12% and 15% would “never” perform PAS, 
respectively (Table 8). This discrepancy between the belief that PAS should be legalized 
and the actual willingness to practice it if it were legal is consistent with findings in the 
literature and our previous survey data from a large academic institution.(16,19) 
In order to assess why this discrepancy persists, we asked those physicians who 
thought PAS should be legal but would be unwilling to perform it to explain why in a 
free response text box. The single most common response (47%) was a lack of training or 
expertise with respect to PAS since it was outside the scope of their practice (Table 10). 
The next most common themes were religious/spiritual teachings (11%), should be an 
option for patients (8%), legal implications/hurdles (7%), ethical/moral opposition to the 
practice of PAS (5%), PAS is rarely ever truly indicated (5%), and could not personally 
perform PAS due to its inherent severity (4%) (Table 10).  
Several conclusions can be inferred from these responses. The first is that 
religion/spiritual teachings play a role in physicians’ decisions about performing PAS, 
which has been consistently shown to be the case in the literature.(11,21) The second is 
that ethics and morals are important in physicians’ decisions. Several respondents 
invoked the Hippocratic oath and “do no harm” as to why they would not perform PAS. 
This is not surprising as one of the oldest and most consistently used arguments of those 
opposed to PAS is that it goes against the physician credo of “to do no harm.”(24) Next, 
some physicians are unlikely to perform PAS due to fear of legal action taken against 
them should they perform the practice. The fourth and arguably most interesting 
conclusion can be drawn from the answers indicating PAS being outside the scope of 
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physicians’ practices, its inherent severity, and that it should be an option for patients. It 
is clear from these responses that physicians think that patients should have the option to 
choose PAS; however, the doctors would be unwilling to perform it because it is outside 
the scope of their practice. On the one hand, this unwillingness could be due to a lack of 
training or expertise with respect to PAS. Perhaps if some of these physicians had 
specific training in performing PAS, they would be more willing to perform it, which 
some respondents did explicitly state. Our sample also had a large percentage of 
pediatricians, which likely lead to an increase in this reason since PAS is never a 
consideration for their practice in the US. On the other hand, it could simply be an 
indication that physicians think patients should have the option to PAS without any real 
internal exploration of why they think it should be an option for patients but would not 
personally want to perform it. It is easier to simply say that it is outside their scope of 
practice than it would be to address a potential internal discrepancy between belief and 
willingness to practice.  
Underlying many of these “outside of specialty” responses is likely a feeling 
toward the inherent severity of PAS, which 5% of respondents explicitly identified. This 
feeling is explained quite well by Robert Burt when he writes about “ambivalence” 
toward death. He argues that although it is conceivable that death can be a moral good or 
at least morally neutral in some cases, there exists a pervasive sense that death is wrong 
or a “moral error.”(25) Burt writes, “We cannot readily erase a persistent contrapuntal 
conviction that death…is inherently wrong.”(25) Our data seem to suggest that 
physicians today generally want their patients to have control over their deaths, but 
physicians remain uncertain about their own participation.(19) This ambivalence is 
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further supported by the finding that of those who thought PAS should be legal, 27% 
agreed that, “Medical professionals should never intentionally hasten death at the end of 
life” (Table 9).  
Current Practices of PAS 
 
When asked about current practices of PAS in states where it is legal, only 24 % 
of physicians disagreed (49% agree; 26% neutral) that the most common reason for 
patients seeking PAS is physical pain (Table 4). The data about the practice of PAS in 
Oregon from Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act indicate that most patients who seek PAS 
do so because of loss of autonomy and being less able to engage in activities that make 
life enjoyable and not because of physical pain.(26) In fact, physical pain is not even in 
the top five reasons why patients seek PAS. This finding suggests that physicians in 
general are misinformed as to why patients seek PAS at the end of life.  
 When asked about current safeguards, most physicians (59%) agreed that they are 
adequate (Table 4). This is a larger percentage than previously reported in the literature. 
A study from Oregon found that only 37% of emergency medicine physicians thought 
that the Oregon initiative had adequate safeguards.(14) When asked about specific 
safeguards, however, physicians were less sure. Sixty percent of respondents disagreed 
that a physician other than a psychiatrist could effectively screen a patient seeking PAS 
for depression (Table 4). Furthermore, 60% disagreed that most physicians can 
adequately predict if a patient seeking PAS has 6 months or less to live (Table 4).  
 These results have important implications. First, physicians in general doubt that 
doctors who are not psychiatrists can adequately screen patients seeking PAS for 
depression. Most patients who ask for PAS have a diagnosis of terminal cancer.(26) A 
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study of cancer patients showed that of those who had a desire to die, 59% had depressive 
syndromes. Of those patients who did not have a desire to die, only 8% had depressive 
syndromes.(27) Thus, there is evidence to suggest that many patients with terminal 
cancer who seek death have depression. The data from Oregon, however, indicate that 
less than five percent of patients seeking PAS are evaluated by a psychiatrist.(26) If the 
majority of patients seeking PAS have terminal cancer, and most terminal cancer patients 
desiring death have signs of depressive syndromes, then more than five percent of 
patients seeking PAS should be evaluated by psychiatrists. It seems that physicians who 
responded to this survey are right to doubt the effectiveness of this specific safeguard. 
Indeed, a study from Oregon has found that of those patients who received a lethal 
medical for terminal illness, 1 in 6 had clinical depression.(28) 
 The second implication of these findings is that prognosis as a safeguard is 
fraught with inadequacies. Respondents in general disagree that most physicians can 
accurately predict if a patient seeking PAS has 6 months or less to live. These opinions 
are supported by the literature. Physicians are generally hesitant to provide life-
expectancies to patients because they think they are challenging to predict because it is 
“difficult” and “stressful”.(29) Furthermore, a recent study found that only 57% of 
physicians were accurate when predicting a patient had six months or less to live.(30) 
Taken together, it is clear that both the opinions of physicians and the literature support 
the ineffectiveness of current safeguards used to protect patients with mental illness and 
longer prognoses who are seeking PAS.  
 It should be noted as well that prognosis is dependent on the willingness of a 
patient to accept treatment. A patient with insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus who 
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refuses insulin will be dead in less than six months. Though this patient is not “terminal” 
in the classic sense, she would qualify for PAS under the current laws. This is a large 
loophole in arguably the most important safeguard of current PAS laws.  
Implications of PAS Legalization 
 
 A slight majority (52%) of physicians thought PAS legalization would improve 
the clinical care of patients at the end of life, while a third (33%) thought it would not 
(Table 5). Respondents were more likely to disagree when asked if the medical 
profession would be viewed more negatively (26% agreed, 43% disagreed, 32% neutral) 
and if patients would trust their physicians more (24% agreed, 35% disagreed, 40% 
neutral) if PAS were legalized (Table 5).  
 Most physicians disagreed that patients of lower socioeconomic status, racial or 
ethnic minorities, and those with mental or physical disabilities would feel pressure to 
end their lives through PAS (58, 69, 49%, respectively)  (Table 5). These opinions are 
supported by at least one study, which found that there was no heightened risk for abuse 
of PAS in populations based on race/ethnicity, income, and disabilities.(31) Though there 
is evidence supporting the unbiased nature of the practices of PAS, it is still important to 
continue monitoring for bias in states where it is newly legalized. The data for the 
aforementioned article comes from Oregon, which is a predominately white state. 
Patients have historically been discriminated against based on race throughout the history 
if the practice of medicine, and there is no reason to assume that PAS would be any 
different than other practices in medicine.(32) Furthermore, those in the disability 
community have consistently been vocal about their fears of abuse with respect to 
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PAS.(33) These concerns must be heard and routinely evaluated to ensure safe practices 
of PAS.  
 With respect to economic ramifications of legalization of PAS, most physicians 
(62 %) thought it would save the healthcare system money. This is consistent with 
findings from a recent article published in Canada that suggested that the Canadian 
healthcare system could save as much as 140 million dollars through the use of PAS.(34) 
Additionally, nearly half of physicians (46%) thought that the legalization would lead to 
health insurance companies preferentially covering the cost of PAS over more expensive, 
life-saving treatments like chemotherapy (Table 5). The US desperately needs to control 
its healthcare spending. Indeed, in 2010, one quarter of all Medicare spending was 
attributed to the last year of life.(35) It is apparent that any practice that effectively 
shortens the length of end-of-life care will likely decrease the cost of healthcare 
nationwide. 
The question, however, is how medicine as a profession wants to cut spending. 
Do we set the precedent of providing the means for patients to kill themselves by 
legalizing PAS to lower costs with the possibility of creating an environment where 
insurance companies favor paying for PAS rather than more expensive treatments? Or do 
we strive for an intellectually more difficult and laborious process of examining how we 
as a profession view death and dying in order to create an environment where death is not 
a crisis from which a patient must be rescued?(36)  
 When asked about legal concerns, the majority of respondents (43%) disagreed 
that the legalization of PAS would lead to an increase of medical malpractice suits (Table 
5). This is logical as the current PAS laws have protections for physicians against 
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malpractice suits. A majority disagreed (51%, 32% agreed) that the national legalization 
of PAS would lead to increased number of suicides in the community. This is the 
opposite of what is reported in the literature. The Werther effect, also known as copycat 
suicide, is the phenomenon that a widely publicized suicide increases the rate of suicides 
thereafter.(37) A recent study examined this effect with respect to PAS legalization and 
found a 6.3% increase in statewide suicide rates (assisted and non-assisted) in states 
where PAS has been legalized.(38) The association is correlative and not causative, but it 
is an important consideration nonetheless when thinking about the legalization of PAS.  
 The last question in this section assesses what physicians think about the “slippery 
slope” argument, which will be explained in detail in Part II of this thesis. A slight 
majority (43%) disagreed that the legalization of PAS would lead to the legalization of 
euthanasia, while about a third (30%) agreed (26% neutral) (Table 5). The respondents 
seem to be relatively split on this topic, which is similar to the climate in the US in 
general. There are many who proclaim that the slippery slope will never happen in 
America, while others use it as strong justification against the legalization of PAS.(39) 
Indeed, many physicians refer to countries like Belgium and the Netherlands where both 
PAS and euthanasia have been legalized as realization of the slippery slope 
argument.(40) There was a motion recently bought up in the Oregon Senate to allow 
individuals identified by a power of attorney to administer the lethal drugs to the 
terminally ill patient if that patient no longer had the capacity to administer it 
themselves.(41) Furthermore, on January 15, 2019, a bill was introduced in the New 
Mexico house entitled the “Elizabeth Whitefield End of Life Option Act.” This would 
make PAS legal in New Mexico and expand the inclusion criteria. The bill does not 
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require a patient to “self-administer” and allows patients with mental illnesses to request 
PAS.(42) This is certainly evidence that the slippery slope argument does have merit in 
the US and must be considered.  
 
 
Other Considerations Regarding PAS 
 
 Sixty-five percent agreed that PAS is sometimes necessary to relieve suffering, 
and 58% agreed that it is sometimes necessary to respect patient autonomy (Table 6). The 
former finding is similar to previous data at a large academic institution, which found that 
73% of physicians agreed that it is sometimes necessary to hasten death through PAS to 
relieve suffering.(19) The latter supports the conclusion mentioned above that in general 
physicians think that patients should have the right to choose to end their lives through 
PAS.  
Seventy-eight percent agreed that there are important ethical distinctions between 
PAS and withdrawing life support (Table 6). This accords with current practice and ethics 
of end-of-life care in the US, which acknowledges this distinction to be true. 
Furthermore, most (68%) disagreed that a patient’s request for PAS should override the 
physician’s moral objections to performing it (Table 6). This is in agreement with the 
understanding in medicine that physicians are moral agents, and society and patients must 
respect this.(43) Interestingly, physicians were more undecided than expected when 
asked if the medical profession should endorse PAS as a morally valid medical option. 
Forty-nine percent agreed, 32% disagreed, and 17% were unsure (Table 6). Once again, a 
discrepancy is present—although 60% think PAS should be decriminalized, only 49% 
think it is a morally valid medical option (Table 1, Table 6). Furthermore, of those who 
	 	 	33
thought PAS should be legal, 81% agreed that PAS should be endorsed by the medical 
profession as a morally valid option (Table 9). Nineteen percent disagreed or were unsure 
if the medical profession should endorse PAS, but they still think it should be legal.  
The vast majority of respondents (76%) disagreed that physicians who participate 
in PAS abandon their patients (Table 6). They were split when asked if PAS would be 
unnecessary if patients had access to excellent palliative care (38% agreed, 45% 
disagreed) (Table 6). The latter question was asked because it could be argued that if 
patients had access to the best palliative care, which would include biological, social, 
spiritual, and psychological care, a practice like PAS would never be needed—or at least 
rarely needed. Since most concerns of patients seeking PAS are existential, if time was 
taken to work through those thoughts, feelings, and preparations, perhaps patients would 
not need a practice like PAS.(26) 
Physician Perspectives on Death 
 
 This section was given to respondents to get a sense of how important they 
thought talking and thinking about death was in their daily practices. Eighty-three percent 
agreed that they were comfortable talking with patients about death, and 81% agreed that 
their ability to think about their own mortality was relevant to providing good care for 
patients at the end of life (Table 7). These are promising findings. In order to be able to 
actively and effectively talk with patients about death, one must be able to think about 
and discuss their own mortality with his or herself.  
 The final result, which was briefly mentioned above, further supports the 
existence of an inconsistency in physicians’ beliefs and practices. Respondents were 
almost exactly split down the middle when asked if medical professionals should never 
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intentionally hasten a patient’s death at the end of life (43% agreed, 41% disagreed) 
(Table 7). When this data was correlated with data about legality of PAS, it revealed that 
27% of those that thought PAS should be legal agreed that medical professionals should 
never intentionally hasten death (Table 9).  
Strengths and Limitations 
 
The strength in our study lies in the breadth and novelty of the questions in our 
survey tool. We also sent the survey to a generous sample (1000) of random physicians 
from around the US.  
 Our analysis is limited by the survey tool used, low response rate, and small n. 
Although the specific questions were vetted for clarity and simplicity, it is likely that 
some of the questions could have been interpreted in more than one way decreasing the 
accuracy of our analysis. This has indeed been shown to be the case in the literature 
specifically with surveys based on physicians’ attitudes surrounding assisted suicide.(44) 
Our response rate is lower than the average for surveys of physicians (54%); thus, it is 
likely that there is a degree of non-respondent bias.(45) Although non-respondent bias is 
likely less important than other sources of bias, 22% is a low response rate, which will 
inevitably engender some non-respondent bias. It is unclear why our response rate was 
this low as we used a validated survey administration technique that routinely produced 
response rates of around 60%.(9,21,22) Possible explanations could be the length of this 
survey and the use of a $2 incentive instead of the reported $20 in the final survey 
mailing. Our small n decreases the overall generalizability of our study, although 




Our results suggest that there are several important aspects of physicians’ 
perspectives surrounding the national legalization of PAS. The first is that there is a 
discrepancy between belief and willingness to practice PAS. Although the majority of 
physicians agreed that it should be legalized, only a small portion of those would 
unequivocally perform the practice if it were legal. Furthermore, our data indicate that 
this incongruity between belief and practice could be attributed to 1) a general 
misunderstanding on the part of physicians as to why patients seek PAS, 2) a lack of 
training or expertise with PAS, and 2) an inherent discomfort with the practice due to its 
intimate relationship with death. A second finding is that physicians believe the current 
safeguards protect patients, but when asked about the specific aspects of these safeguards, 
they question their adequacy. Most notably, 60% of respondents thought that physicians 
could not adequately determine if a patient seeking PAS had 6 months or less to live, 
which is arguably the most important safeguard in place. Third, physicians are still wary 
of the proverbial “slippery slope.”  Not only do about a third of the physicians think that 
PAS legalization would lead to euthanasia, but nearly half believe that health insurance 
companies would preferentially cover PAS over more expensive, potentially life-saving 
treatments like chemotherapy. 
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Physician-assisted suicide (PAS), also known as aid-in-dying, is currently legal in 
seven states, decriminalized in one, and illegal in forty-two. As it is increasingly 
becoming an option for physicians and patients, it is important to determine if this is 
something that is morally permissible for physicians to offer. In this paper, I will provide 
an argument against the legalization of PAS by showing that it is morally impermissible 
according to four commonly invoked bioethical considerations: role morality, the 
“slippery slope,” doing vs. allowing, and foreseeing vs. intending.  
PAS is defined as a physician prescribing a lethal dose of drugs that patients may 
then administer themselves with the intention of ending their lives. This practice is 
distinct from euthanasia, in which a physician directly administers a drug or drugs with 
the intention of ending the patient’s life. I will only be addressing PAS in this paper.  
  
Role Morality  
 
I will first use role morality arguments to justify my position against the national 
legalization of PAS. In order to provide a robust argument, I will use David Luban’s 
formulation to show that a physician’s role morality precludes a physician from 
participating in PAS.  
Before tackling the formulation, it is beneficial to describe role morality. Briefly, 
it is the idea that when one holds a certain role, such as a lawyer, physician, or engineer, 
one will be granted a different set of moral oughts/obligations/codes than the common 
	 	 	37
morality of the general public. For example, due to the physician’s role, she has a 
different obligation to disclose confidential information than someone from the general 
public. While one would ordinarily be required by law to disclose pertinent information 
about someone in a criminal trial, a physician, asked to disclose similar information that 
she obtained in her professional role, would be obligated to non-disclosure by the sanctity 
that the medical profession puts on the physician-patient relationship. But from where 
does role morality come? How is it built? And, what are its limits? Luban provides some 
answers.    
Luban describes role morality with what he calls, “the Fourfold Root of Sufficient 
Reasoning.”(46) This offers a scaffold that dissects role morality into four links that 
consecutively build upon each other. The first link is the “institution,” then “roles,” 
followed by “role obligations,” and finally “role acts.”(46) Using a physician treating a 
patient with heart failure as an example, the medical profession would be the institution; 
physician would be the role; providing evidence-based care would be the role obligation; 
and prescribing an Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme (ACE) inhibitor would be the role 
act. Luban also explains that each of these links is related to each other in a specific way. 
He writes, 
…the agent (1) justifies the institution by demonstrating its moral 
goodness; (2) justifies the role by appealing to the structure of the 
institution; (3) justifies the role obligations by showing that they are 
essential to the role; and (4) justifies the role act by showing that the 
obligations require it.(46)  
   
Thus, the physician in my previous example justifies the medical profession because of 
its moral goodness (the profession seeks to heal individuals). She justifies her role as a 
physician because that is a role the medical profession has identified to be useful. 
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Furthermore, she justifies the role obligation to treat with evidence-based medicine 
because that is essential to being an effective physician. And finally, she justifies the role 
act of prescribing an ACE inhibitor because the role obligation requires her to treat with 
medications that are evidence based, which ACE inhibitors are.   
 Luban then goes on to explain how this model can be used to justify a role act if it 
is contrary to common morality. He describes two possible ways of using this model, one 
he terms the minimal-threshold test and the other, the cumulative-weight test.(46) In the 
former, a role act is justified if the former three links are justified, even if only weakly. 
This is an all or nothing approach and the strength of justifications of each link does not 
matter. It only matters that they are justified. Luban (rightly, I think) abandons this for the 
cumulative-weight test, which takes into account the strengths of the justifications of each 
link when assessing if a role act contrary to common morality is permissible.  
 Thus, with an understanding of the Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reasoning and the 
cumulative-weight test we can apply it to the role act of a physician not participating in 
PAS. In this case, the institution and role are the medical profession and physician, 
respectively. With respect to the role obligation and role act, the former is the obligation 
to “do no harm,” and the latter is the act of not participating in PAS.  
The role obligation to “do no harm” has been a principle of medicine since its 
inception. It is arguably the most crucial element of medicine and enables the sanctity 
and trust of the physician-patient relationship. By acting against this principle, physicians 
directly undermine this core relationship and the trust of patients in their doctors, 
ultimately resulting in a deterioration of the profession. With respect to the case of PAS 
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then, the role obligation to do no harm should be upheld, and a physician should not 
participate in the act of PAS.  
One possible argument against my claim includes the role of moral 
acknowledgement. Role of moral acknowledgment refers to the duty of a professional to 
respond to others, even if it is in violation of professional duties.(46) For example, it is 
permissible for a psychiatrist to divulge confidential information about a patient if it 
would result in the prevention of harm to others. The psychiatrist must violate her 
obligation of confidentiality as a physician in order to prevent harm to another individual. 
Indeed, this is exactly what the courts ruled in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 
California. (47) One might also suggest that a physician must use moral acknowledgment 
to respect patient autonomy (or beneficence/relief of suffering) over the obligation to “do 
no harm” when a patient requests PAS.  
I am not arguing that the role of moral acknowledgment is unnecessary in 
medicine. It is absolutely required in certain circumstances. Moreover, I believe that the 
obligation to respect patient autonomy or beneficence/relief of suffering can override the 
obligation to “do no harm” (surgery, for example). But, when the questions of respect for 
autonomy/beneficence and moral acknowledgment drive a physician to respect those 
principles by guiding and providing the means for patients to kill themselves, the 
principle of “do no harm” must trump the others. The physician has an ample amount of 
tools (palliative care, hospice care, religious/spiritual services, social workers, etc.) in the 
tool kit to be beneficent and relieve suffering. One does not need to resort to prescribing a 
lethal dose of barbiturates so the patient can committing suicide to achieve those goals. 
As a final note, although PAS would not be morally justified for physicians to perform 
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based on the argument I have presented with respect to the physician’s role morality, 
there may be other roles in society where this practice might be acceptable (i.e. 
thanatologists or others outside the medical profession). 
 
The “Slippery Slope” 
 
The “slippery slope” argument has routinely been used as an argument against the 
legalization of PAS in the United States. Briefly, the slippery slope argument states that 
once a certain norm is accepted it will inevitably lead to the acceptance of a morally illicit 
norm. For the present case, the argument would be that legalization of PAS will 
inevitably lead to the legalization of euthanasia. For the purposes of this argument, I am 
assuming that taking of human life, except possibly in self-defense or to defend another, 
is illicit.	It is true that not all slippery slopes are considered equal, and there are important 
considerations. How many “steps” is the initial norm from the morally illicit one? How 
steep is the slope (how fast would the acceptance of the morally illicit occur)? And how 
exactly does one get from one already morally questionable norm (in the case of PAS) to 
the more morally illicit norm (euthanasia)? What are the factors that influence this 
transformation?  
Eugene Volokh and David Newman’s description of the slippery slope can 
adequately address these questions. They break down the slippery slope into four distinct 
mechanisms: cost-saving, “attitude-altering”, changing of political powers, and 
“desensitization”.(48) The cost-saving mechanism is straightforward and it follows that 
once the initial step is taken the morally illicit step becomes economically easier and 
more feasible.  One example they use to explain this involves gun registration. The 
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slippery slope is the following: if a law is passed that mandates all gun owners to register 
their firearms, it will lead to the government confiscating personal firearms, which is the 
morally illicit norm. The initial step, gun registration, would require the design and 
implementation of an incredibly expensive and complicated registration system. Once 
this step is complete, however, the economic barrier has been hurdled. It becomes 
exceedingly easy and inexpensive for the government to confiscate guns because the 
costly registration system already exists.(48)  
It is just as easy to imagine this playing a large role in the slippery slope from 
PAS legalization to euthanasia legalization. The act of PAS is much cheaper for 
insurance companies than expensive, possibly life-saving treatments like chemotherapy. 
Indeed, this is what happened to Stephanie Packer in California. As her scleroderma 
progressed, her doctors thought that switching to another chemotherapy drug would 
provide an extension of life. The insurance company however denied her claim for 
chemotherapy but did approve the cost of a prescription for life-ending drugs—with a co-
payment of $1.20.(49)  
The second mechanism is “attitude-altering.”  This generally relies on what laws 
say rather than what they do. If something is law, then individuals will tend to think that 
it ought to be law.(48) The example given by Volokh and Newman refers to the Patriot 
Act. When lawmakers were considering this legislation, which would allow the 
government to track email addresses and websites that an individual used or visited, they 
cited the “pen register” as a precedent. This was a Supreme Court ruling twenty years 
prior that approved the monitoring of telephone numbers in a similar way. When 
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lawmakers referred to the pen register, they did not consider the merits of the law itself 
but accepted it as something that ought to be law because it was law.(48)  
This mechanism is certainly applicable to the legalization of PAS. One can 
imagine that if PAS is legalized, it might follow that many people will think it ought to be 
legal since it is law. Then, when considering legalizing euthanasia, the merits of the 
legalization of PAS will not be considered for it is already law. Since, ostensibly, 
euthanasia is not that different from PAS, it will be easier to legalize euthanasia. This is 
highlighted in a famous New Yorker article entitled, “The Death Treatment” about a 
euthanasia case of depressed woman in Belgium named Godelieva. The author writes 
that, “Until Godelieva’s death, Tom [her son] had never given much thought to 
euthanasia…He assumed that the law was for old people who were already dying. Now it 
seemed to Tom that there were few people reflecting critically on the law.”(50)  
Acceptance of the first step could also lead to changes in the power of political 
groups, the third mechanism by which Volokh and Newman explain slippery slope. The 
example they use is the legalization of marijuana. The slippery slope here is that if 
marijuana is legalized, advertising for marijuana will be legalized and consumption will 
increase. One can imagine that if marijuana were legalized, it would open up a multi-
billion dollar industry. The money from this industry could then be used to fund powerful 
lobbies in Washington that could influence Washington to push for legislation to legalize 
marijuana advertising. Once this legislation passed congress, the increased exposure of 
individuals to marijuana through advertising could ultimately increase consumption.(48) 
Indeed, adult consumption of marijuana has slightly increased in Colorado since 
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legalization.(51) The unintentional exposure of pediatric patients to marijuana has also 
steadily increased in Colorado since legalization.(52) 
While it is certainly unlikely that the legalization of PAS will unleash a multi-
billion dollar industry, one can imagine its legalization changing powers of certain 
political groups. Consider, for example, the disability community and Compassion and 
Choices, the oldest and best-funded non-profit organization supporting national 
legalization, as examples of two opposing political groups. The disability community is, 
on the whole, one of the largest outspoken opponents of legalization of PAS. One could 
imagine that if PAS were to be legalized nationally, the political power of Compassion 
and Choices might increase further. They would become champions of the law (and as 
mentioned above, if something is law, it must ought to be law). This might afford them 
more power and a larger voice than that of the disability community. With this newfound 
power, they could push for broader inclusion criteria for physician-assisted-suicide and 
ultimately legalization of euthanasia. Though there is no data available at the moment to 
support this claim, it is still an important consideration especially since the acceptance of 
PAS is increasing nationally.  
Volokh and Newman refer to the final mechanism as “desensitization.” This is the 
idea that people will focus on big changes but ignore the small ones.(48) The parable of 
the boiling frog illustrates this well. If a frog is tossed into boiling water, it will 
immediately jump out. If the frog is placed in a pot of water at room temperature while 
the heat is gradually increasing, however, the frog will get cooked. When applied to 
people this means that individuals will not devote much mental energy to small policy 
changes. They reserve this mental energy for larger decisions.(48)  
	 	 	44
This mechanism is certainly applicable to the slippery slope of legalization of 
PAS. One can imagine little changes to the inclusion criteria for eligibility of 
participating in the practice. Why six months to live and not seven? Why not eight, nine, 
twelve? It is unlikely that people will pay attention to these little policy changes. What 
about extending PAS to those individuals with terminal illness who are unable to move? 
Why should those individuals not have the opportunity to participate in this practice just 
because they physically are unable to administer the medication themselves? In this case 
a physician would have to directly administer the medication, which would be euthanasia. 
This would be a minor (practically, certainly not ethically) policy change to which people 
may not pay much attention, and it could set the precedent for legalization of euthanasia.   
The most obvious counterargument to the claims I have just made is that there are 
adequate safeguards in place in the United States, thus we will not slip down the slope to 
euthanasia legalization. Furthermore, that fact that we are not “like” the European 
countries that have passed euthanasia laws is also invoked as an argument against a 
slippery slope. It is true that when opponents of PAS legalization invoke the slippery 
slope argument they almost exclusively refer to what has happened in the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Canada. Certainly, after twenty years of the Death with Dignity Act in 
Oregon, there are no currently reported data of  “slippery slope” examples occurring in 
Oregon.  That being said, it is a bit presumptuous and naïve to think that just because the 
United States is the United States we will not slide down that slippery slope. Indeed, as 
mentioned in Part I, there was recently a motion put forth in the legislation in Oregon to 
allow euthanasia for immobilized, terminally ill patients since they could not themselves 
administer a lethal dose of medication.(41) This was voted down, but there is now a new 
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bill in New Mexico that would expand the inclusion criteria of patients who are able to 
seek PAS, which was mentioned in more detail in Part I.(42) The fact that both of these 
bills have been introduced to state legislatures is evidence that the slippery slope is 
relevant in the US and is an important consideration. Moreover, it certainly should not be 
assumed that medicine will necessarily take the moral high ground. The history of 
medicine is plagued with discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual 
orientation. One need only look to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study to understand medicine’s 
susceptibility to flawed moral and ethical judgment and disrespect for human rights.(53)   
But, what about the safeguards in place? Surely they will prevent the plunge down 
the slippery slope. As mentioned above, through “desensitization” these safeguards could 
be incrementally changed to expand the inclusion criteria for those seeking PAS. 
Additionally, it is unclear if these safeguards are working as intended. As mentioned in 
Part I, recent data from Oregon indicate that of those seeking PAS, less than five percent 
receive a formal psychiatric evaluation from a psychiatrist.(26) We know that most 
people seeking PAS have terminal cancer, and a large portion of cancer patients have 
depression. Thus, it is unlikely that only less than five percent of those who seek PAS 
should be receiving a formal psychiatric evaluation.  
 
Doing vs. Allowing 
 
The next argument commonly invoked with regard to the legalization of PAS is 
the distinction between “doing” and “allowing”. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s take on 
Philippa Foot’s famous Trolley Problem classically exemplifies this distinction. The 
scenario is as follows: There is a trolley with broken brakes hurtling down a track, and it 
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will inevitably run over and kill five people if nothing is done. Someone who is watching 
this happen notices a switch next to the track. If she flips this switch, the train will be 
diverted onto another track. This track however has one person on it who will be killed if 
the trolley is diverted (Figure 1). Is it morally permissible for the woman to flip the 
switch? In the second scenario, the conditions are the same, except a man atop a bridge is 
watching this train hurtling down the track on course to kill five people. He is standing 
next to a man of such significant proportions that if he is pushed in front of the train, he 
will stop the train but die in the process (Figure 2). Is it morally permissible for the 
bystander to push the man in front of the train?  The intuitive answer to this question is 
always that the first is permissible but the second is impermissible. But why is this the 
case? Ostensibly, it seems that both scenarios are equivalent.  
   
Figure 1. Trolley Problem First Scenario.(54) 
     
                           
 
Figure 2. Trolley Problem Second Scenario.(55)  
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Foot explains this moral intuition with positive and negative duties.(56) On the 
one hand, negative duties are those in which it is required to refrain from doing harm. On 
the other hand, positive duties are those that require one to assist with those in distress. In 
the trolley example, the negative duty is to refrain from killing the one, while the positive 
duty is to save the lives of the five. Foot indicates that negative duties carry more moral 
stringency than do positive duties.(56) But why is this the case? Thomson addresses this 
by invoking the distinction between diverting and introducing a threat. In the first 
scenario, the threat of the trolley is simply being diverted from five people to one. There 
is no introduction of an additional threat in this case—the threat is merely diverted to 
fewer people. In the second scenario, the threat of the trolley killing five can only be 
stopped by pushing the man onto the tracks. In this case, a threat that had not been there 
previously—the man being pushed onto the tracks and dying—is introduced. Thus, she 
believes it is morally acceptable to divert a threat that is already present to save the lives 
of the five, but it is morally unacceptable to introduce a new threat to one to save the 
lives of the five.(56) Thus, it seems that it requires considerably more moral justification 
to override negative duties than it does for positive ones.   
In the first scenario, the woman pulling the lever must decide between two 
negative duties. She must refrain from killing five or refrain from killing one, which is an 
easy moral choice, so she may flip the switch. In the second scenario, the man must 
decide between a negative duty to refrain from killing the man and a positive duty to save 
the five. Because there is more moral stringency on negative duties, the man must refrain 
from killing the man rather than save the five.(56)  
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I can now apply this to the distinction between withdrawing life-support and PAS. 
In the case of withdrawing life-support, the physician has a positive duty to respect her 
patient’s autonomy to refuse treatment and a positive duty to relieve suffering. There is 
really no choice in this case because each are positive duties that are certainly morally 
permissible; thus, the act of withdrawing life-support is permissible. With respect to PAS, 
the positive duties of respecting patient autonomy and relief of suffering are pitted against 
a negative duty to refrain from killing. As negative duties carry more stringency, it is 
morally impermissible for the physician to override the negative duty of refraining from 
killing and offer PAS to satisfy the positive duties of respect for patient autonomy and 
relief of suffering. One might claim that the physician who withdraws life-support 
precipitates the patient’s death, which would override the negative duty of refraining 
from killing. But, the physician is not introducing a new threat in this case—the 
underlying disease actively killing the patient is already present and removal of life-
support allows the natural disease process to take its course. In the case of PAS, the 
physician is introducing a new threat by prescribing a lethal dose of medication to patient 
so they can commit suicide—a threat that was not there prior to involvement by the 
physician.    
I would now like to address some additional arguments that James Rachels puts 
forth with regard to the distinction between withdrawing life support and euthanasia. His 
position is that there is no important distinction between the two.(57) Although he 
explicitly writes about euthanasia, his arguments can easily be applied to PAS. His first 
argument involves an example of a man with incurable throat cancer who wishes to 
remove all life-sustaining treatments. In doing so, Rachels argues, the physician actually 
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increases suffering because it may take longer for the patient to die than if 
euthanasia/PAS were used. He indicates that this is in direct contradiction to the premise 
that drives removal of life-sustaining treatment in the first place, namely relief of 
suffering. While it is true that removing life-sustaining measures compared to that of 
euthanasia/PAS may prolong the dying process, adequate pain control is still available 
and feasible. Although it is unlikely that physicians can completely control pain during 
the dying process, they can almost always adequately address it. Thus, while the dying 
process may be longer, it is not necessarily a “suffering” process due to physical pain—
although there may still be a large component of “existential” suffering, and there are 
certainly other ways to ameliorate this suffering rather than suicide.  
More importantly, however, the goal of removal of life-sustaining treatment is not 
primarily the relief of suffering—it is driven by the recognition that there is little to no 
benefit from continued aggressive intervention. Although it is routinely the case that 
there is relief of suffering by withdrawing care, it is not the primary intention. Rather, the 
intention is to remove burdensome care that is no longer efficacious—the benefit of the 
treatment no longer outweighs the negatives of receiving the treatment. This is unlike 
PAS in which the primary intention is to relieve suffering by killing the patient. The idea 
of intention with respect to PAS will be explored more thoroughly in the following 
section. 
His next argument, which I think is more robust, is his claim that killing is no 
morally worse than letting die.(57) He uses two cases to support his claim. In the first, 
Smith will get a large inheritance if his six-year-old cousin dies. One night, while his 
cousin is taking a bath, Smith enters the bathroom, drowns his cousin, and arranges 
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things to make it look like an accident. In the second case, Jones stands to gain the same 
inheritance and plans to kill his cousin in the same way Smith did. When Jones walks in 
to the bathroom, however, his cousin is already drowning and Jones lets his cousin 
“accidently” drown. The two cases are identical except Smith kills his cousin, while 
Jones “lets” his cousin die. Rachels argues that this distinction is not important since they 
both had the same intention and motive. The simple fact that one killed and the other “let 
die” is not enough to make any real moral difference.(57)  
With further examination of the two cases, however, we can see that there is a 
subtle difference. What was the actual cause of the cousin’s death in each case? In the 
first, it is clear that Smith is the cause. If he had not been in the bathroom, the cousin 
would not have drowned. But, this is not the case in the second. In fact, if Jones had not 
been in the bathroom, his cousin would still have drowned. Put concisely, Smith was the 
means of his cousin’s death, while Jones was not the means of his cousin’s death.  
Although I do agree with Rachels that this distinction is not strong enough to 
make Jones’ action morally defensible, when it comes to withdrawing life-support and 
PAS the distinction is important. Examining these two cases, there is the same 
distinction. On the one hand, when a physician withdraws life-sustaining treatment, he is 
not the direct means of the patient’s death; the underlying, terminal disease is. On the 
other hand, when a physician prescribes a lethal dose of medication for a patient to 
consume, she is the means of the patient’s death. The American College of Physicians’ 
description of the distinction is nicely worded: 
Withdrawal of treatment based on patient’s wishes respects patient’s 
bodily integrity and right to be free of unwanted treatment. 




But, isn’t the act of removing life-support by the physician the cause of the patient’s 
death? If the physician were not there, the patient would still be alive (although still 
actively dying unlike the child in the tub) on the life-sustaining measures. The common 
understanding is that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and not starting life-
sustaining treatment are ethically equivalent. There is no distinction between the two. A 
patient can initially refuse life-sustaining treatment whether a physician is present or not. 
It is not the presence of the physician that is the cause of the patient’s death; it is the 
underlying disease. This same reasoning can then be applied to withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment as it is ethically equivalent.    
 
Foreseeing vs. Intending and the Doctrine of Double Effect 
 
 
 The final argument considers the distinction between foreseeing and intending.  
What is the difference between giving pain-relieving medication while foreseeing that the 
needed medication may hasten death and giving a lethal dose of medication with the 
intention of killing the patient to relieve suffering? The doctrine of double effect is 
routinely invoked to address this distinction. This doctrine states that the permissibility of 
an action with a foreseeable evil side effect depends on the intention of the action. The 
formal formulation is as follows:  
1. The action in itself from its object be good or at least indifferent. 
2. The good effect and not the evil effect be intended. 
3. The good effect be not produced by means of an evil effect. 




I will examine and address each of these steps in turn following analyses already 
discussed by Stephen Latham using classical Catholic moral theories, then use them to 
show the distinction between PAS and the use of pain medication to relieve suffering.  
 First, I will examine step one, “The action in itself from its object be good or at 
least indifferent.” Catholic moral theory begins examination of this step with a discussion 
of interior and external acts. Interior acts are those that one considers only internally. 
There is no acting upon the outside world. Exterior acts are those that are considered 
internally and then acted upon the outside world.(60) For example, one might consider 
eating an apple. This would be an interior act. If that individual then acted upon the 
outside world to grab and eat an apple, it would be an exterior act. These acts can then be 
determined good or evil depending on the object to which the act aims.(60) An “object of 
an action is that which the agent sets out to do or effect.”(60) Or, simply, an object is the 
good at which an agent aims.  
 When considering interior and external acts, it is important to consider the ends of 
these acts. On the one hand, the object and the end are not the same in external acts. For 
example, a soccer player’s object may be to score a goal, while the end—via the action of 
scoring—would be to win the game and move onto the semifinals. On the other hand, the 
object and end are the same in interior acts. Simply thinking about eating an apple has no 
other end outside the thought itself. 
 External acts must then be judged as good or evil based on their objects and not 
the ends.(60) Suppose I wish to help a fellow medical student out by giving her a study 
guide I made. If my action is to help a fellow medical student (object) by giving her my 
study guide (end), then the action may be considered good. If, however, my action is to 
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help bolster my image and reputation as a kind, generous, and cooperative medical 
student (object) by giving a study guide to her (end), then the action would be evil (or at 
least less good). Thus, applying this to the original case between PAS and administration 
of pain medication, the object of the former is killing the patient while that of the latter is 
administration of morphine. Although they each have the same end to relieve suffering, 
only the latter is good “in itself from its object.”(60) 
 Step two of the formulation addresses what the actor intends. But how does one 
determine what someone intends? Catholic moral theory uses a description of the 
interrelated relationship between Intellect and Will to discuss this. Every human action 
begins with Intellect, which is the ability to understand the facts of the world and make 
judgments about them. The Intellect can then decide what it wishes to attain from this 
understanding and judgment—an end. Will, is then, the setting in motion of actions that 
will lead to the attainment of this end. Thus, “intention” can then be thought of as the 
leaning of the Will to attain some end that the Intellect finds desirable. This does not 
mean that intention is a means to an end, however. For example, if I wish to learn how to 
play guitar (Intellect’s end), my Will can intend to do so, but I still have to find the means 
to do this—hire a teacher or learn through a video game, etc.(60)  
 Latham then addresses the distinction between intentions of proximate and distant 
ends. Without this analysis, one might think that the intention in both cases, PAS and 
administration of pain medication, is the same, to relieve suffering. It is just the means 
that are different in each case. But if one considers proximate and distant intentions, this 
is not true. In both cases, there is a distant intention aimed at the end of being good 
physicians. In each case, there is a more proximate intention aimed at the end to relieve 
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suffering that in turn would lead to the distant end of being a good physician. But, in the 
case of PAS, there is an even more proximate intention aimed at the end of killing the 
patient to attain the more distant end of the relief of suffering. Thus, one can say that the 
proximate end of administrating pain medication is relief of suffering, while the 
proximate end of PAS is killing the patient in order to satisfy the more distant end of 
relief of suffering.(60) 
 The third step of the formulation is relatively straightforward and does not need 
extensive analysis. The good effect must not be produced by an evil act. It would be 
permissible for me to make my colleague famous by writing an article touting her 
accomplishments, but it would be impermissible if I made her famous by writing an 
article filled with slander.  
 The last step of the formulation, “There be a proportionally grave reason for 
permitting the evil effect,” has to do with the circumstances surrounding the act. In order 
for an act to be considered good, it must have a good object, good end, and good 
circumstances.(60) For example, if a child with ruptured appendicitis is in a considerable 
amount of pain, it would not be justified to give an adequate amount of pain medication 
to completely relieve his suffering if there was a chance that that amount would lead to 
his death. Although this is a surgical emergency, the child is highly likely to survive 
following surgery. If, however, a child is in a considerable amount of pain during a 
sickle-cell crisis with fulminant multiple organ failure, then a potentially lethal dose of 
pain medication would be justified. In the latter case there is a proportionally grave 
reason to give a dose of pain medication that may kill the patient. He is likely to die, thus 
controlling his pain at the risk of hastening death is permissible.  
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 All that is left now is too apply each of the four steps of the doctrine of double 
effect to PAS and the administration of pain medication. With regards to PAS: There are 
two effects of the act, one good (relief of suffering) and one bad (killing the patient). Is 
the act in itself from its object good? No, the object is to kill the patient. Is the good 
effect and the not the evil effect intended? No, the proximate end of killing the patient is 
intended. Is the good effect not produced by means of the evil effect? No, the relief of 
suffering is produced by means of killing. Is there a proportionally grave reason for 
permitting the evil effect? As there are doubtless other ways to relieve suffering, this is 
likely “no.” In any case, PAS fails to meet the criteria of the doctrine of double effect and 
is therefore impermissible.(60)  
 With respect to administration of pain medication: There are two effects of the 
act, one good (relief of suffering) and one bad (risk of killing the patient). Is the act in 
itself from its object good? Yes, the object is to give the patient pain medication. Is the 
good effect and not the evil effect intended? Yes, the proximate end of relief of suffering 
is intended. Is the good effect not produced by means of an evil effect? Yes, relief of 
suffering is produced my means of administration of pain medication. Is there a 
proportionally grave reason for permitting the evil effect? This depends on the 
circumstances. If there are ways to relieve suffering that do not put the patient’s life at 
risk, then this is a “no”. If there are no alternative approaches, then this is a “yes”. In the 
latter case, administration of pain medication is therefore morally permissible when 
considering the criteria set forth by the doctrine of double effect.(60) 
 I foresee two potential arguments against the doctrine of double effect. First, some 
argue that intention does not and should not matter.(61) It is the outcome that matters, not 
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the intention (consequentialism). Even if the intention of the physician was not to kill the 
patient when giving a potentially lethal dose of medication (the intention was to relieve 
suffering), the act is still morally impermissible if the patient dies because the patient 
dies. This claim that intention does not matter seems counterintuitive, however. There are 
numerous acts that have good and bad effects but are still routinely considered 
permissible. Consider surgery; although a surgeon causes controlled trauma to a human 
being, it is considered permissible because the intention is to repair an injury or to heal 
the patient. If intention did not matter, it would be virtually impossible for an individual 
or society to attain desirable ends.  
 The second argument states that while intention matters, one is still morally 
responsible for the ultimate outcome—the death of the patient due to a lethal dose of pain 
medication. I agree with this statement, but I do not think its veracity is mutually 
exclusive with the doctrine of double effect. Being held morally responsible for an action 
does not necessarily have bearing on the determination of the moral permissibility of that 
action. A physician who inadvertently causes the death of a patient by administering a 
necessary dose of medication to control pain is responsible for the patient’s death. The 
act, however, is still morally permissible as indicated by intention and the doctrine of 





By examining the bioethical arguments of role morality, the “slippery slope,” 
doing vs. allowing, and intending vs. foreseeing, I have shown that PAS is morally 
impermissible. Included in the physician’s role morality is the concept of “do no harm”, 
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which is integral to the safe and ethical practice of medicine. While this doctrine is often 
breeched when the good benefits outweigh the harms (i.e. surgery), it should never be 
breeched when the harm is directly and intentionally causing the patients death. Although 
there is no current data from Oregon to supporting the veracity of the “slippery slope” 
argument, PAS legalization is still susceptible to it, which could ultimately lead to the 
more prevalent and expanded use of the practice and the legalization of euthanasia. Next, 
by examining the ideas of positive vs. negative duties and introducing vs. diverting 
threats, it is clear that withdrawing life-support and PAS are morally distinct practices—
the former is “allowing” and the latter is “doing”. Finally, a close examination of the 
proximate intentions of PAS and relieving pain with administration of a possibly lethal 
dose of medication reveal that they are morally distinct, and the criteria of the doctrine of 






 In this thesis, I first showed that there are several important aspects of physicians’ 
beliefs about PAS that should be considered when discussing the appropriateness of 
legalizing PAS nationally. I then presented through discussions of several, well-
established bioethical considerations—role morality, the “slippery slope”, doing vs. 
allowing, and foreseeing vs. intending—that the practice of PAS is morally 
impermissible. It is clear that this issue is heavily nuanced and is more complex than just 
an argument to relieve suffering and respect the autonomy of dying patients.  
Perhaps medicine should push for a treatment of death and dying different from 
endorsing a practice that intentionally kills patients. Death in the US and most of the 
western world has been “medicalized.”(36) Rather than being surrounded by community 
and family, death and dying has moved to the domain of medicine, as a large portion of 
patients at the end of life die in the hospital. One of the most important reasons for this is 
how the medical profession and society more broadly handle death. Death is something to 
be shunned, ignored, and saved for a later day. Especially in medicine, the topic of death 
is routinely averted in cases where it should necessarily be discussed. Moreover, death is 
treated like something that can be conquered or cured rather than an inevitable part of 
life. As a result, patients and physicians address death and face difficult end-of-life 
decisions for the first time when it is already too late—when patients are already dying in 
the hospital. These circumstances obviously lead to inferior end-of-life decision-making 
and care.  
I am under no illusion that death is an easy topic to talk or think about. It certainly 
is not. As mentioned before, we, as humans, have an inherent, existential uneasiness or 
	 	 	59
“ambivalence” toward death.(25) But, I think we can, and need, to do better to initiate 
conversations about death and dying early and often.  In her book, Lydia Dugdale uses 
the Ars Moriendi as an example of what this might look like.(62) The Catholic Church in 
Europe released this handbook in the decades following Europe’s worst outbreak of the 
Bubonic Plague. It was essentially a checklist of items that people could use to prepare 
for the death of themselves and their loved ones and offered a framework that spiritually, 
emotional, and practically prepared individuals to confront and accept the inevitability of 
death.  
A system like this would certainly look different in 2019, but if there were a 
profession-wide, and society-wide, push to create a system that strove for the similar 
preparation for death, it could transform the quality of end-of-life care. Most patients who 
ask for physician-assisted suicide do so because of loss of autonomy and being less able 
to engage in activities that make life enjoyable.(26) These are existential concerns, not 
concerns about physical pain. I have to wonder that if we had a system alike to the Ars 
Moriendi in place that prepared individuals for death, existential concerns at the end of 
life would be minimized and a practice like physician-assisted suicide would be 
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Appendices 
 Appendix 1 
	
Please indicate for each of the questions how important each item is for you when thinking 
about the legalization and practice of physician-assisted suicide.  
 
1) Patients will perceive the medical profession more positively. 




e) Strongly disagree 
2) Patients will perceive the medical profession more negatively. 




e) Strongly disagree 
3) Patients will trust their doctors less. 




e) Strongly disagree 
4) Patients will trust their doctors more. 




e) Strongly disagree 
5) Legalization of PAS would negatively affect marginalized or underserved 
communities, including but not limited to racial and ethic minorities, the disabled, the 
elderly, and those of lower socioeconomic status. 




e) Strongly disagree 
6) The legalization of PAS with save health care system money.  




e) Strongly disagree 
7) Medical professionals should never intentionally induce death (“do no harm” 
argument). 
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e) Strongly disagree 
8) The legalization of PAS will lead to the legalization of euthanasia (“slippery slope” 
argument) 




e) Strongly disagree 
9) The legalization of PAS will improve the clinical care of patients at the end-of-life. 




e) Strongly disagree 
10) The legalization of PAS will worsen the clinical care of patients at the end-of-life. 




e) Strongly disagree 
Are there any factors that affect how you think about PAS that are not listed above? If so, 
please list them here (free response):  






In this study, we would like to know your views on physician-assisted suicide (PAS), also 
known as aid-in-dying (AID), in the United States.  
 
PAS/AID occurs when physicians provide patients with prescriptions for lethal medications 
that patients may self-administer with the intention of ending their lives. PAS/AID is 
currently legal in six US states, decriminalized in one state, and illegal in forty-three.  
 
This practice is distinct from euthanasia, in which a physician directly administers a drug or 




Legality of PAS/AID 
 





















Current Practices of PAS/AID 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements for the 
practice of PAS/AID in states where it is currently legal: 
 






















5. Current PAS/AID laws provide safeguards (patient must be competent, ≥ 18 yo, prognosis ≤ 6 mo, 
capable of self-administration of medication, request observed by 2 witnesses). 
 















6. Current PAS/AID laws require physicians who suspect depression or other mental illness in a patient 
seeking PAS/AID to consult a psychiatrist. 
 
































Implications of PAS/AID 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
If PAS/AID were legalized throughout the United States: 
 





































































































15. Health insurance companies would cover PAS/AID over more expensive, possibly life-saving 






























































Other Considerations Regarding PAS/AID 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 















































































































Physician Perspectives on Death 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements about death: 
 













27. My ability to think about my own mortality is relevant to providing good care for patients at the end 




























29. How often are you faced with end-of-life issues in your daily practice? 
 
Several times a week 
Every week 
Nearly every week 
Two to three times a month 
About once a month 
Several times a year 
About once or twice a year 





















30. If you think PAS/AID should be legal or decriminalized but would unwilling or unlikely to perform 























If you would be willing to participate in a 10-20 minute confidential phone interview about 
physician-assisted suicide/aid-in-dying and the practice of medicine, please check this box  and 
indicate below the preferred way to reach you. A portion of respondents who volunteer will be 
contacted.   
         Phone number: (_____) ________________           
         E-mail: ____________________________ 
 
Demographics 
  In the following questions, please tell us more about you and your practice. 




























34. What is your preferred gender identity? 
 
____________________________ (leave blank if you do not wish to specify) 
 
 






36. How would you classify your race?  [CHECK ONLY ONE] 
 
Asian 
If Asian, do you think of yourself as… 
East Asian or Pacific Islander 
South Asian 
Other Asian 
Black or African American 
American Indian or Alaskan Native 
White or Caucasian  
Other (please specify): _________________________ 
Do not wish to specify 
 














THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! 
